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The rapid, sprawling growth of modern suburbia' has exerted in-
tense pressure on the financial capacity of local governments to
provide schools, parks, roads, and other facilities required by new
residents.' Municipalities and counties have lacked the capital
funding resources to both accommodate suburban growth and
maintain the quality of governmental services.8 Some local govern-
ments have attempted to halt or retard growth,' but most have
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1. The rush to the suburbs over the past decade has been significant. Between 1970 and
1978 the white population of central cities in the United States decreased at an annual rate
of 1.2 percent. The net central city decrease in white population over that period totalled
almost 5 million residents. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNrrE STATES: 1979 at 17 (100th ed. 1979).
2. During 1977, over 28 billion dollars were expended by local governments for capital
outlays. This represents an increase of approximately 71 percent over the 1970 capital ex-
penditures of 16 billion. In contrast, state and federal capital expenditures reflected smaller
increases in capital outlay over the same period, 27 percent and 68 percent respectively. Id.
at 288. See also C. HAAR, LAND USE PLANNING 3-47 (3d ed. 1976).
3. See FLORDA BuREAU OF LAND AND WATER MANAGEMENT, CHARLOTTE HARBOR: A FLOR-
IDA RESOURCE (1978). This report illustrates the complexity of environmental, economic, and
municipal service delivery problems that growth imposes on local governments. In the case
of the Charlotte Harbor area, the problem of furnishing adequate water supplies to accom-
modate projected growth has created an emergency situation of regional proportion. Id. at
31-35. See also C. HAAR, supra note 2, at 443-513.
4. State courts have demonstrated a growing tendency to invalidate various exclusionary
zoning devices on various constitutional grounds. See, e.g., City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas
Corp., 371 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (population cap served no valid munici-
pal purpose); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 283 A.2d 353 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1971) (municipality cannot ignore responsibility with respect to regional housing needs);
Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. v. Township of Concord, 268 A.2d 765 (Pa. 1970) (violation of due
process). See generally Bigham & Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning Practices: An Examination
of the Current Controversy, 25 VAN. L. REv. 1111 (1972); Davidoff & Gold, Exclusionary
Zoning, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACT. 56 (Winter 1970); Juergensmeyer & Gragg, Limiting
Population Growth in Florida and the Nation: The Constitutional Issues, 26 U. FLA. L.
REv. 758 (1974); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and
the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. Rav. 767 (1969).
Courts have approved plans which seek to slow the rate of growth rather than stop growth
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chosen to cope with growth-induced financial difficulties by em-
ploying a variety of means to shift the cost of providing capital
improvements to the new residents who create the need for them.'
The development of capital cost shifting devices grounded in
land use control regulations has been rapid and turbulent." Despite
the lack of enabling legislation,7 the presence of powerful builder
and developer lobbies,s and an uncertain response by the courts to
the new land use control mechanisms, local governments have per-
sisted in their attempts to shift the costs of growth.9 In the years
completely. See Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal
dismissed 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). For contrasting views on the Ramapo decision, see Bos-
selman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights of the Whole World? 1
FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 234 (1973) and Landman, No, Mr. Bosselman, the Town of Ramapo
Cannot Pass a Law to Bind the Rights of the Whole World: A Reply, 10 TULSA L.J. 169
(1974).
5. The proposition that new residents should bear the capital expenses they create
would not seem unfair. In the absence of capital cost shifting devices the developer reaps
windfall profits. After all, the developer "sells" his customer the schools, recreational facili-
ties, fire protection, etc., that are primarily paid for by the older residents of the commu-
nity. See generally Jacobsen & Redding, Impact Taxes: Making Development Pay its Way,
55 N.C. L. REV. 407 (1977).
6. Courts have rarely found constitutional or statutory obstacles to ordinances requiring
developers to provide interior streets, sidewalks, and sewers. See, e.g., City of Buena Park v.
Boyar, 8 Cal. Rptr. 674 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (developer may reasonably be required to
provide sewers, water mains, sidewalks and the like); Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31
(1949) (reasonable to require developer to dedicate land for boundary highway); Brous v.
Smith, 304 N.Y. 164 (1952) (town can require developer to provide interior roads). But
many state courts, at least initially, invalidated provisions requiring land dedication or fees
for schools and parks. See, e.g., Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631 (4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1957) ($30 per lot fee for school and park facilities invalid); Rosen v. Village of Down-
ers Grove, 167 N.E.2d 230 (I1. 1960) (fee for school facilities invalid); Coronado Dev. Co. v.
City of McPherson, 368 P.2d 51 (Kan. 1962) (required dedication for park, playground, and
other public purposes invalid). Many of these courts, however, have since changed their
minds. Compare Gulest Assoc., Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1960)
(fee for recreational purposes invalid) with Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 271 N.Y.S.2d
955 (1966) (dedication and fee requirements for park and recreational purposes valid; Gul-
est expressly overruled), and Admiral Dev. Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (fee and dedication requirement for parks invalid) with Wald Corp.
v. Metro. Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (dedication for canals
for flood control permissible requirement). See generally Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitu-
tionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through
Subdivision Exactions, 73 YAE L.J. 1119, 1122 (1964).
7. See Jacobsen & Redding, supra note 5, at 407, 414.
8. For instance, a bill specifically authorizing the imposition of impact fees was intro-
duced in the Florida legislature in 1974. See Fla. HB 3126 (1974). It fell victim to aggressive
development industry lobbying. Rhodes, Impact Fees: The Cost Benefit Dilemma in Flor-
ida, 27 LAND Usa LAW & ZOMrNG DIGST no. 10 at 7 (1975).
9. For an analysis of how communities in Illinois improvised in the face of restrictive
state court decisions, to extract some capital funding aid from developers, see Platt &
Moloney-Merkle, Municipal Improvisation: Open Space Exactions in the Land of Pioneer
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ahead, the need to use such devices will undoubtedly intensify.10
Current economic and political developments such as high interest
rates and diminished federal revenue sharing funds will have
harsh if not disastrous effects on capital financing by local
governments.
Impact fees are charges levied by local governments against new
development in order to generate revenue for capital funding ne-
cessitated by the new development. These fees are playing an in-
creasing role in the efforts of local governments to cope with the
economic burdens of population growth such as the need for new
roads, schools, parks, and sewer and water treatment facilities.12
Unfortunately for local governments, the use of impact fees has
been subjected to numerous legal challenges. The purpose of this
article is to analyze the case law relevant to those challenges and to
propose criteria for determining the validity of impact fees. In Part
I, the historical development of impact fees is examined as is their
relationship to other capital cost shifting land use regulations. Part
II provides a national perspective on constitutional and other legal
challenges to impact fees." Part III analyzes the status of impact
Trust, 5 URB. LAW. 706 (1973).
Many communities have used the tactic of coercion to effectuate various capital cost shift-
ing regulations. As a practical matter, most developers are forced to comply with the re-
quirements laid down by local governments because of the prohibitively expensive financing
and opportunity costs incurred as a result of protracted delay caused by litigation. D.
HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 253 (1975). Class action
suits by builder and developer associations have been effective in remedying this disadvan-
tage. Id. See, e.g., Santa Clara County Contractors & Homebuilders Ass'n v. City of Santa
Clara, 43 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (contractors association has right to sue on
behalf of members); Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla.
1976) (contractors association sued city challenging validity of impact fees).
10. See Small, The Palm Beach County Experience, 2 FLA. ENv'L & URB. Issus 4 (Oct.
1974).
11. In a survey of cities receiving revenue sharing funds, the three top priorities for the
use of the money were capital improvements, public safety, and maintenance. Freilich, Cur-
rent Developments in Local Government Law-A Review of Recent Decisions, Statutes
and Events, and Their Impact in the Field of Urban Law, 6 URB. LAW. 288, 292 n.12 (1974).
This reflects both the paucity of locally generated funds available for capital improvements
and the serious impact that a reduction of revenue sharing funds would have on local gov-
ernments' abilities to provide capital funding to adequately accommodate subdivision
growth.
12. See Jacobsen & Redding, supra note 5, at 407; Zimmerman, Tax Planning for Land
Use Control, 5 URB. LAW. 639, 675-76; Note, Subdivision Land Dedication: Objectives and
Objections, 27 STAN. L. REV. 419, 442-45 (1975).
13. The discussion in this article of constitutional challenges to impact fees is not in-
tended to be exhaustive. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 94
Cal. Rptr. 630, 637, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Ivy Steel & Wire Co. v. City of
Jacksonville, 401 F. Supp. 701, 704 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
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fees in Florida, with specific consideration given to (a) the special
need for impact fees in Florida created by the pre-platted land
problem, (b) statutory authorization of impact fees, (c) the tax ver-
sus regulation problem, (d) the emerging criteria for assessing the
police power validity of impact fees, and (e) the post-Dunedin de-
velopment of impact fees in Florida.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF IMPACT FEES
The first land use regulation developed to shift the capital ex-
pense burden to the developer and new residents was the required
dedication." Local governments conditioned their approval of a
subdivision plat upon the developer's agreement to provide and
dedicate such improvements as streets and drainage ways."8 Re-
quired dedications for these intradevelopment capital improve-
ments is now a well accepted part of subdivision regulation's and is
generally approved by the courts.
1
7
The in lieu fee developed as a refinement of required dedica-
tions. To require each subdivision to dedicate land to educational
purposes would not solve the problem of providing school facilities
for developing suburban areas because the sites would often be in-
adequate in size and imperfectly located." The in lieu fee solves
this problem by substituting a money payment for dedication
when the local government determines the latter is not feasible.
The impact fee is functionally and conceptually similar to the in
lieu fee in that both are required payments for capital facilities.1'
In fact, in certain situations the terms can be used virtually inter-
14. See 1 J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, FLOPIDA LAND USE RESTmCTIONS § 9.02
(1976). See also 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZOMNG §§ 19.24, 19.25 (1968).
15. Authority to impose these conditions was generally inferred from subdivision Maps
and Plats Acts which were originally designed to facilitate the conveyance of land. Since it
became customary to require a plat to be approved for accuracy before it was approved for
recording, this afforded a convenient point of control when the need for more comprehen-
sive regulation became apparent. Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 167 N.E.2d 230, 234
(Ill. 1960).
16. Required dedications for school and park purposes have met with increasing ap-
proval by the courts. See note 6 supra. Because the facilities will be located within the
subdivision there is a clear benefit to the new residents. Also, these dedication requirements
may actually improve the developer's profit from the subdivision, eliminating the taking
issue. See Note, supra note 12, at 419-30. See generally Note, Mandatory Dedication of
Land by Land Developers, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 41 (1973).
17. See cases cited in note 6, supra.
18. R. ANDERSON, supra note 14, § 19.42.
19. In lieu payments are currently being assimilated into the impact fee concept. Both
are fees used to fund schools, parks, and other facilities located outside the subdivision. J.
JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 14, § 9.03.
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changeably. The impact fee concept, however, is a much more flex-
-ible cost shifting tool. Because in lieu fees are predicated on dedi-
cation requirements, they can only be used where required
dedications can be appropriately utilized. In the case of sewer and
water facilities, public safety facilities, and similar capital outlays,
required dedications are not an appropriate device to shift a por-
tion of the capital costs to the development because one facility
(and parcel of land) can service a very wide area and there is little
need for additional land in extending these services.
Impact fees are usually collected at the time building permits
are issued rather than when the land is platted.20 In addition, im-
pact fees typically are calculated on the basis of the number of
bedrooms or living units in a development' rather than as a per-
20. J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 14, § 17.01.
21. Jacobsen & Redding, supra note 5, at 408. In drafting an educational impact fee,
Collier County used the following formula then used by the Collier County Board of Educa-
tion to calculate its expansion needs based on new dwelling units in the community:
The amount of fee to be paid shall be calculated according to the following
formulae and shall be an amount equal to the sum of the educational facilities and
acreage costs necessary to support the pupils generated by each new dwelling unit,
less the estimated percentage of State Aid received for capital outlay.
a. Acreage cost per dwelling unit shall be calculated thusly- (a X b X c X d)
+ (e X b X c X f) + (g X b X c X h)- x
b. Construction costs per dwelling unit shall be calculated thusly- b X j = w
c. Percentage of State Aid shall be determined by the estimates provided in
the Five Year School Plant Survey conducted by the Florida Department of Edu-
cation - y
d. Total fee owed shall be calculated as the construction costs plus acreage
cost less State Aid = (1 - y) (x + w)
e. In the above formulae, the above used letters are given the following
significance
a represents the percentage of school age children in grades kindergarten-
grade 5
b represents the average school age children per household
c represents the existing raw land prices per acre
d represents the number of acres required per elementary school site di-
vided by the number of pupils per elementary school
e represents the percentage of school age children in grades 6-8
f represents the number of acres required per middle school site divided
by the number of pupils per middle school
g represents the percentage of school age children in grades 9-12
h represents the number of acres required per secondary school site di-
vided by the number of pupils per secondary school
j represents the current cost of facilities per pupil (excluding land costs)
w represents the construction cost per dwelling expressed in dollars
x represents the acreage cost per dwelling expressed in dollars
y represents the percentage of State Aid available.
Collier County, Fla., Ordinance 78-36 (July 18, 1978).
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centage of acreage or its equivalent value. 2 Finally, impact fees
normally are collected for extradevelopment construction rather
than intradevelopment facilities.
The distinctions between in lieu fees and impact fees result in
several decided advantages for impact fees. First, impact fees can
be utilized to fund types of facilities and capital expenses which
are not normally the subject of dedication requirements and in lieu
fees, 2 and can more easily be applied to facilities to be constructed
outside the development (extradevelopment) as well as those in-
side the development (intradevelopment). 4 Second, as discussed in
Part III, impact fees can be applied to developments platted before
the advent of required dedications or in lieu fees and thus impose
on incoming residents their fair share of these capital costs.2 5 This
advantage is particularly important in Florida where hundreds of
thousands of vacant lots were platted prior to 1970. A third advan-
tage is that impact fees can be applied to condominium, apart-
ment, and commercial developments which create the need for ex-
tradevelopment capital expenditures, but generally escape
dedication or in lieu fee requirements because of the small land
area involved or the inapplicability of subdivision regulations." Fi-
nally, impact fees can be collected at the time building permits are
22. For example, in Admiral Dev. Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860, 861 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1972), the city code read as follows:
Sec. 13-8. Dedication of park and recreation area-When land is subdivided
within the city.
(a) When lands are subdivided within the city, at least five per cent (5%) of the
gross area of such lands shall be dedicated by the owner to the city for park and
recreation purposes ....
(b) If, in the judgment of the city council, the land to be subdivided is too small
for a park or recreation area to be dedicated from such land, then the owner shall
pay to the city a sum of money, equal to five per cent (5%) of the value of the
gross area ....
MArrLANI, FLA., CODE § 13-8 (1972). In some ordinances the in lieu fee is not tied to land
value but like the impact fee is stated in terms of a dollar amount per residential unit. See
Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 444 (Wis. 1965) (in lieu fee for
school, park, and recreation needs of $200 per residential lot), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4
(1966).
23. See Jacobsen & Redding, supra note 5, at 408.
24. See Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976)
(impact fee funding expansion of sewer and water facilities).
25. Juergensmeyer, Drafting Impact Fees to Alleviate Florida's Pre-Platted Lands Di-
lemma, 7 FLA. ENVT'L & URB. IssuES 7 (April 1980). In the absence of impact fees, residents
moving into pre-platted subdivisions would not be making the same contribution to educa-
tional and recreational capital funding which are required of residents moving into recently
platted subdivisions through dedications and in lieu fees. Id. at 8.
26. Note, supra note 12, at 443-44. See also Zimmerman, supra note 12, at 675-76.
IMPACT FEES
issued and when growth creating a need for new services occurs,
rather than at the time of platting.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO IMPACT FEES
The validity of impact fees is generally subject to a two-tiered
constitutional attack. The preliminary and often dispositive objec-
tion to required payments by developers for capital expenses is
that they are not authorized by state statute or constitution 7 and
therefore are void as ultra vires.' 8 If statutory authority is found,
the local ordinance is alternatively challenged as an unreasonable
regulation exceeding the state's police power or as a disguised tax
which violates various state constitutional strictures."
A review of recent constitutional challenges to impact and in lieu
fees discloses a changing judicial attitude towards these cost-shift-
ing devices."0 Despite earlier negative reaction to such payment re-
quirements, 1 state courts currently tend to validate them as a
27. See, e.g., City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So. 2d 363 (Ala. 1978) (in
lieu fees for recreational purposes not authorized by state statute); Admiral Dev. Corp. v.
City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (dedication and in lieu fees
for park and recreational purposes not authorized by city charter). See also Heyman &
Gilhool, supra note 6, at 1134, n.66 (citing cases where issue of statutory authority was
dispositive).
28. The power of a local government to exercise various subdivision controls, including
impact fees, is derived from general state statutes, private acts, and municipal charters. E.
YoKLEY, THE LAW OF SUtDnVSIONs 7 (1963).
29. See, e.g., Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) (in lieu fees for flood
control, park, and recreational purposes attacked as ultra vires, an unreasonable regulation,
and as an unconstitutional tax); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442
(Wis. 1965) (in lieu fees for school, park, and recreational purposes attacked as ultra vires,
an unreasonable regulation and as an unconstitutional tax), cert dismissed, 385 U.S. 4
(1966). See generally Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 6, at 1122, 1146.
30. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630
(1971) (subdivision fees for recreation purposes approved), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 878
(1971), Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964) (required
dedication for recreational purposes upheld); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 271
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966) (in lieu fees for recreational purposes upheld); Call v. City of West
Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) (in lieu fee for flood control, park, and recreational pur-
poses upheld); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965) (in lieu
fee for school, park, and recreational purposes upheld).
31. See notes 71-81 and accompanying text, infra. Unlike zoning enactments, which
since Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365 (1926), have received great deference from
the courts, money payment requirements for extradevelopment capital funding initially re-
ceived careful scrutiny. Ironically, zoning decisions have a much greater economic impact on
the land owner or developer. See Johnston, The Constitutionality of Subdivision Control
Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52 CORNmL L.Q. 871, 912 n. 189 (1967). See, e.g.,
Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 167 N.E.2d 230 (Ill. 1960) (fees for educational purposes
invalid under police power); Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 176
N.E.2d 799 (Ill. 1961) (fees for educational purposes not authorized); Gulest Assoc., Inc. v.
1981]
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proper and reasonable exercise of police power. 2 These decisions,
however, have utilized different and inconsistent legal theories to
circumvent the restrictive standards initially established.33 The
courts' reluctance to clearly characterize these payments as either
land use regulations or taxes has aggravated the confusion."
A. Impact Fees: Land Use Regulations or Taxes
The characterization of impact fees as land use regulations or
taxes presents a complex problem.35 Required dedications, which
serve the same purpose as impact fees, are an acknowledged police
power regulation. 6 Because impact fees are functionally similar to
dedications and to other land use planning and growth manage-
ment tools, the regulation tag appears appropriate.3 7 Although
commentators have generally adopted the regulation characteriza-
tion,"8 the taxation rubric theoretically is equally appropriate, par-
ticularly when the positive nature of impact fees3" and hornbook
distinctions between a tax and a regulation are considered."
The label applied in a particular case will depend on the speci-
Town of Newburgh, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1960) (fee for educational purposes unreasonable
regulation and invalid), afl'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1962).
32. See note 31 supra.
33. Johnston, supra note 32, at 913-14; Comment, Subdivision Exactions: The Constitu-
tional Issues, the Judicial Response, and the Pennsylvania Situation, 19 VILL. L. REV. 782,
799-802 (1974).
34. See Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 450 (Wis. 1965) (court
admitted it was unable to decide whether in lieu fee was a regulation or an excise tax).
35. In any problem of characterization, these words of Walter Wheeler Cook are
relevant:
The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules, and
so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the
same scope in all of them runs through all legal discussions. It has the tenacity of
original sin and must be constantly guarded against.
Hancock, Fallacy of the Transplanted Category, 37 CAN. B. REv. 535, 575 (1959) (footnote
omitted).
36. See E. YOKLEY, 2 ZONING LAW AND PsACTICE § 14-3 (1978); notes 14-17 and accompa-
nying text, supra. But see Note, Subdivision Exactions: Where is the Limit?, 42 NoTRE
DAMz LAW. 400, 404 (1967) (required dedications are taxes and not regulations).
37. Juergensmeyer, supra note 26, at 8. But see Note, supra note 36, at 404.
38. See, e.g., Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 6, at 1134; Johnston, supra note 32, at 917;
Juergensmeyer, supra note 26, at 8.
39. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 6, at 1146.
40. According to Professor Cooley, a demand for money can be upheld under the police
power only if its primary purpose is regulation. If its primary purpose is revenue, it is an
exercise of the taxing power. 4 T. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATiON § 1784 (1924). According
to those who argue that impact fees are taxes, such fees are primarily a revenue raising
device regardless of whether they are spent inside or outside the development. See Note,
supra note 36, at 408-09.
IMPACT FEES
ficity and clarity of the enabling statute.4 1 Either label could be
effectively employed by state legislatures to delegate authority to
impose properly constituted impact fees for extradevelopment
funding;42 however, in most cases neither the statutory authoriza-
tion relied upon nor the local ordinance provides a clear guide to
characterization by the courts.
The choice a court makes in tagging the impact fee will often be
determinative of its validity. If the tax label is adopted, the impact
fee will be invalidated unless express and specific statutory author-
ization for the tax exists.48 Even if statutory authorization is pre-
sent, constitutional limitations on taxation may still invalidate the
statute.44 Alternatively, if the impact fee is construed as a police
power regulation, very broad legislative delegation will suffice.45
Once past this statutory hurdle, the clear trend among state courts
is to validate such extradevelopment capital funding payment re-
quirements as a valid exercise of the police power.46 Not surpris-
41. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 6, at 1146. Although the mere labeling of an impact
fee as a regulation in an enabling statute should not be determinative, courts may be ex-
pected to give deference to the legislature's judgment. Cf. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v.
City of Walnut Creek, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971) (court relied heavily on legislative report in
sustaining validity of in lieu fee for recreation and open space), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S.
878 (1971).
42. See Doebele, Improved State Enabling Legislation for the Nineteen-Sixties: New
Proposals for the State of New Mexico, 2 NAT. R.SOURcE J. 321 (1962); Heyman & Gilhool,
supra note 6, at 1146-54. Impact fees could successfully be authorized as an excise tax on
the development business if a legislature chose to do so. Id. Under the taxing power, how-
ever, judicial supervision of the fees would be greatly diminished. Id. Cf. Wald Corp. v.
Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863, 867 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (suggesting
that required dedication is in the nature of an excise tax). But see Note, supra note 36, at
409.
43. See, e.g., City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So. 2d 363 (Ala. 1978) (in
lieu fee is a tax and thus must have specific statutory authorization).
44. Many state constitutions contain prohibitions against uneven property taxation. See,
e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 2. Therefore, if impact fees are characterized as property taxes
they would be invalidated by such provisions. See Venditti-Siravo, Inc. v. City of
Hollywood, 39 Fla. Supp. 121, 122-23 (17th Cir. Ct. 1973) (impact fee is an invalid property
tax). If impact fees are to be considered taxes, however, they are more properly character-
ized as excise taxes.
45. See Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 317-20 (Fla.
1976), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979). (If fee is characterized as a tax then it is void for
lack of specific statutory authorization, but because it is a regulation, the broader delegation
will suffice).
46. See, e.g., Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla.
1976), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979) (Impact fee a regulation, valid if proper limitations
placed on amounts collected); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182
(Mont. 1964) (in lieu fee is a regulation which is valid under the police power); Jenad, Inc. v.
Village of Scarsdale, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966) (in lieu fee is a regulation held valid under the
police power).
19811
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ingly, therefore, most state courts have summarily labeled ex-
tradevelopment impact fees as either a tax or regulation in a
result-oriented fashion that avoids an adequate theoretical or pol-
icy-directed explanation.7
There are two rationales either implicit or expressly cited in
those decisions which apply the tax label to extradevelopment im-
pact fees. The first is a simplistic observation that impact fees are
a positive exaction of funds and are therefore a tax.48 This crite-
rion is an untenable basis for distinction because it exalts form
over function.49 It ignores similar police power regulations which
mandate that the developer expend great amounts of funds for
streets, sewers, and other capital improvements within the devel-
opment.60 Any distinction between impact fees and similar police
power regulations made on the basis that impact fees are imposed
prior to the issuance of building permits rather than after the ap-
proval of plats is a distinction without a difference.61 In either case,
funds must be expended by the developer prior to the development
of the subdivision.
52
The second rationale used to label extradevelopment impact fees
as taxes is that funds for education, recreation, and public safety
purposes cannot be raised under the police power.6" This assertion
47. See Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (1966) (court bluntly
stated that "[tihis is not a tax at all but a reasonable form of village planning"); Call v. City
of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220-21 (Utah 1979) (labeling an exercise in semantics, in lieu
fee not a tax but form of planning).
48. See Broward County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d 371, 375 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (prohibiting raising of revenue by a regulatory fee).
49. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
50. See FLA. STAT. §§ 163.260-.270 authorizing the imposition of such requirement on the
developer. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text, supra.
51. The Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975, FLA. STAT. §§
163.3161-.3211 (1979), made no distinction on the basis of whether a regulation is imposed
prior to plat approval or issuance of a building permit. Under the act, "development per-
mit" is defined as any building permit, zoning permit, subdivision approval, rezoning, spe-
cial exception, variance, or any official local government action having the effect of permit-
ting the development of land. FLA. STAT. § 163.3164(6) (1979).
52. Another distinction which could be made is that expenditures for extradevelopment
facilities are a tax but expenditures for intradevelopment facilities can be considered a regu-
lation. But where the facilities are located and the degree of benefit the new residents re-
ceive from the facilities would seem to be an issue which goes to the reasonableness of the
regulation, and not to the issue of whether the fee requirement is a tax or a regulation.
53. See Merrelli v. City of St. Clair Shores, 96 N.W.2d 144 (Mich. 1959) (police and fire
protection are problems which should be financed by general community); Midtown Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 172 A.2d 40, 47, affd per curiam, 189 A.2d 226 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963) (schools should be financed from general revenues of entire com-
munity) (dicta); Daniels v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 129 A.2d 265, 267-68 (N.J. 1957) (city
could not raise funds for school costs under the police power).
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is based on the conviction that such facilities should be financed
solely from general revenues provided by the community as a
whole." There is no constitutional mandate, however, that educa-
tional, recreational, and other facilities be underwritten by the
general population rather than the new residents creating the need
for the additional improvements." Furthermore, this rationale em-
ploys an unduly restrictive and inflexible conception of local regu-
latory power. 51 State courts have increasingly found fees which
shift the burden of capital funding for these extradevelopment fa-
cilities to be within the police power.5
Unfortunately, the decisions adopting the "regulation" label in
assessing the validity of impact fees and similar devices fail to pro-
vide an adequate explanation for their labeling conclusion.5 8 Again,
the choice of label in these cases often seems to have been result-
oriented. A reasoned characterization of a particular impact fee as
54. See Reps & Smith, Control of Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 405,
409-10 (1963); Comment, Money Payment Requirements as Conditions to the Approval of
Subdivision Maps: Analysis and Prognosis, 9 VILL. L. REV. 294, 298-99 (1964); Note, supra
note 36, at 406, 410. But see Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 6, at 1136-41, for a thorough
refutation of the Reps and Smith position that education, recreation, and other facilities
must be funded from general revenues.
55. See note 73 infro. The most compelling of these arguments is that public education
should be "free" and that all those who cannot pay the fee requirement are effectively ex-
cluded from an equal educational opportunity. See Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township of
Madison, 172 A.2d 40, 47 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1961) (inconsistent with democratic
principle to impose on parents any special charge for education of children) (dicta). This
argument, however, ignores the fact that different communities spend varying amounts of
money for education on the basis of tuition-like tax differentials. The Supreme Court Ms
held that the resulting disparity in educational opportunity does not violate the Constitu-
tion. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
56. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926), Justice Suther-
land noted that
[riegulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing
conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago,
or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and
oppressive .... And in this there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of
constitutional guaranties [sic] never varies, the scope of their application must
expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly
coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible
that it should be otherwise.
57. See, e.g., Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964)
(required dedication for recreational purposes upheld); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale,
271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966) (in lieu fees for recreational purposes upheld); Call v. City of West
Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) (in lieu fee for flood control, park, and recreational pur-
poses upheld).
58. See note 48 supra. Cf. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 450
(Wis. 1965) (court was unable to decide whether an in lieu fee was a tax or regulation),
appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
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a tax or regulation must be made with reference to policy consider-
ations that lie beneath the definitional distinction.
The policy issue underlying the tax or regulation conundrum is
whether general or specific statutory authority is an appropriate
delegation of power for the imposition of the impact fee. Such a
determination involves balancing the public policy favoring local
government flexibility in land use planning and growth manage-
ment against the policy of restricting local governments' ability to
tax to those exactions specifically approved by state legislatures. 0
A number of factors should properly weigh in this balancing. These
include the relative specificity of the statute upon which the im-
pact fee is predicated,60 whether the state confers home rule pow-
ers on local governments,"1 the limitations imposed on the impact
fee by the particular ordinance," whether the impact fee is being
used to complement other land use control devices,e the types of
capital improvements funded by the impact fee," legislative indi-
cations of policy in the area,"' and the particular problems of
growth management faced by municipalities in the jurisdiction.66
59. See Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979). In Dunedin the Florida Supreme Court noted that al-
though there were no express statutory provisions governing capital acquisition for sewer
and water facilities other than those authorizing deficit financing, there was no reason to
require that a municipality resort to deficit financing. The court stated that "[o]n the con-
trary, sound public policy militates against any such inflexibility." Id. at 319, 320 (footnote
omitted).
60. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee
Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965), in dicta stated that because in lieu fees had some attrib-
utes of a tax, home rule authority would be an insufficient basis for their imposition. Never-
theless, the general delegation under subdivision control statutes was considered adequate.
Id. at 449.
61. The fact that home rule powers are granted local governments is-indicative of state
policies favoring flexibility and broad regulatory discretion in county and municipal self-
government. See Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 320 n.9
(Fla. 1976) (construction of statute broadened by presence of home rule powers).
62. If an ordinance does not meet police power requirements of reasonableness, then the
impact fee would be invalid under the police power. To be sustained, the impact fees would
have to be valid under the taxing power, see notes 90-107 and accompanying text, infra.
63. Where impact fees are integrated with in lieu fees and required dedications as part
of a total land use control system their character is clearly regulatory. See Juergensmeyer,
supra note 26, at 8, 22-23.
64. The need for expansion of some types of facilities clearly correlates with residential
growth, e.g., schools, parks, sewer, and water facilities, and roads.
65. See Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965). A broad
legislative delegation of authority to regulate subdivisions indicated a legislative policy
which sustained the imposition of in lieu fees for education and recreation. Id. at 449-50,
Accord, Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 1979) (municipal planning
enabling act).
66. Florida, for instance, faces several peculiar problems. First, hundreds of thousands of
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Recent decisions indicate that judicial conceptions of public pol-
icy favor a regulation characterization of fee requirements for ex-
tradevelopment capital funding. 7 In the absence of specific ena-
bling legislation determinations must be made on an individual
basis.6 8 The massive financial problems created by suburban
growth, combined with broad legislative delegations of authority in
land use regulation favor the characterization of impact fees as reg-
ulations.69 Given such a characterization, their validity should be
determined under the police power.
B. Judicial Criteria for Assessing the Constitutionality of
Impact Fees: Early Restrictions
Two landmark decisions placed an almost insurmountable bur-
den on local governments seeking money payments for ex-
tradevelopment capital spending from developers whose activities
necessitated such expenditures."0 In Pioneer Trust & Savings
Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect,7 1 a developer challenged the
validity of an ordinance requiring subdividers to dedicate one acre
per sixty residential lots for schools, parks, and other public pur-
poses. In determining whether required dedications or money pay-
ments for recreational or educational purposes represented a valid
exercise of the police power, the Illinois Supreme Court pro-
pounded the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test. The
court focused on the origin of the need for the new facilities and
held that unless the village could prove that the demand for addi-
existing subdivision lots were platted prior to the implementation of in lieu fees and re-
quired dedications for education and recreation. Thus, impact fees are the only vehicle
available to exact capital contributions from incoming residents to those subdivisions. Also,
many counties in Florida have a high percentage of retiree homeowners. Even though these
older residents indirectly create the need for additional educational facilities and directly
create the need for unique types of municipal facilities and services, a large homestead ex-
emption minimizes their contribution to ad valorem tax revenues. Finally, Florida has ex-
perienced phenomenal population growth over the past several decades. Small communities
are often faced with the prospect that their population will double in a relatively short
period of time. Without capital contributions from the incoming residents, they are unable
to provide adequate facilities and the quality of life desired by both the newer and older
residents. See DEPARTMENT Op ADMINISTRATION, 1977 ECONOMIc REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR
31-41 (1977).
67. See note 32 supra.
68. No Florida statute deals specifically with impact fees; therefore, the determination of
whether an impact fee in Florida is a tax or regulation must be made by the court without
the benefit of explicit legislative characterization of such fees.
69. See notes 1-5 and accompanying text, supra.
70. See Johnston, supra note 32, at 911-13; Comment, supra note 34, at 800.
71. 176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. 1961).
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tional facilities was "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the
particular subdivision, such requirements were an unreasonable
regulation not authorized by the police power.72 Thus, where
schools had become overcrowded because of the "total develop-
ment of the community" the subdivider could not be compelled to
help fund new facilities which his activity would necessitate.
A related and equally restrictive test was delineated by the New
York court in Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh.7s In
that case developers attacked an ordinance which charged in lieu
fees for recreational purposes. The amounts collected were to be
used by the town for "neighborhood park, playground or recrea-
tion purposes including the acquisition of property."'" The court
held that the money payment requirement was an unreasonable
regulation tantamount to an unconstitutional taking because the
funds collected were not used solely for the benefit of the residents
of the particular subdivision charged, but rather could be used in
any section of town for any recreational purposes. In essence, the
Gulest "direct benefit" test required that funds collected from re-
quired payments for capital expenditures be specifically tied to a
benefit directly conferred on the homeowners in the subdivision
which was charged." If recreational fees were used to purchase a
park outside the subdivision, the direct benefit test was not met
and the ordinance was invalid.
Perhaps the reason behind this initial restrictive approach was
an underlying judicial suspicion that payment requirements for ex-
72. 176 N.E.2d at 802. The constitutional standard posited by the Pioneer Trust court
applied to dedications as well as money payment requirements for educational and recrea-
tional purposes. The court held that "if the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically
and uniquely attributable to his activity, then the requirement is permissible; if not, it is
forbidden and amounts to a confiscation of private property in contravention of the consti-
tutional prohibitions rather than reasonable regulation under the police power." Id.
73. 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1962). The
Gulest decision was overruled in Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957
(1966).
74. 209 N.Y.S.2d at 732 (emphasis in original).
75. See Comment, supra note 34, at 797-99. The Gulest rationale was soundly criticized.
The distinction between forced dedication of land and forced payment of fees
seems unsupportable. If a developer can be compelled to dedicate land because
future residents of his subdivision will need parks, there is no reason why those
parks cannot be located outside the subdivision. The need generated by the subdi-
vider's activity remains the same; so long as it is that need which is satisfied,
nothing should stand in the way of improvements which incidentally will be more
advantageous to the whole community.
Note, Techniques for Preserving Open Spaces, 75 HARv. L. RE V. 1622, 1628 (1962).
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tradevelopment capital expenditures were in reality a tax.s Unlike
zoning, payment requirements did not fit neatly into traditional
conceptions of police power regulations.7 By applying the restric-
tive Pioneer Trust and Gulest tests, courts imposed the substan-
tial requirements of a special assessment on such payment require-
ments.7 ' This was consistent with perceiving them as a tax.
7 '
Unfortunately, it effectively precluded their use for most ex-
tradevelopment capital funding purposes, particularly for educa-
tional facilities."0
Despite this early trend, the Pioneer Trust and Gulest tests be-
came difficult to reconcile with the planning and funding problems
imposed on local governments by the constant acceleration of sub-
urban growth.81 This restrictiveness also became difficult to ration-
alize with the judicial view of zoning ordinances as presumptively
valid. Consequently, courts were not convinced of the practical or
legal necessity of such stringent standards for the validation of re-
76. Note, supra note 36, at 408.
77. Cf. Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 226 (Utah 1979) (Wilkins, J., dissent-
ing) (distinguishing subdivision regulations from zoning); Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 6,
at 1146, 1155 (discussing applicability of both the taxing power and police power as bases
for validity of money payment requirements).
78. A special assessment is an amount charged to the owner of a parcel of land which is
benefited by a service or improvement performed by the local government. State legislatures
and courts have generally limited these assessments to the benefit accruing to landowners.
Special assessments, however, are designed to charge existing residents for both services and
capital improvements.
In contrast, impact and in lieu fees charge new residents solely for capital improvements.
Because the date of construction and cost of facilities may be presently unascertainable, the
precise measurement of "benefit" often required in the case of special assessment is not
feasible. See J. J.ERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 14, § 17.03.
Nevertheless, some commentators have approved the "special assessment" confines placed
by early decisions upon money payments for extradevelopment capital expenditures. See
Reps & Smith, supra note 54, at 408-12. But see Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 6, at 1136-
41; Johnston, supra note 32, at 911.
79. There is also a superficial consistency between the Gulest and Pioneer Trust stan-
dard and exactions for streets, which usually are necessitated solely by the new residents
and confer upon new residents the benefit of access to the existing street system. But com-
pulsory dedications for streets have not been confined to that width and alignment neces-
sary to accommodate traffic solely attributable to the new subdivision or to dedication
within the confines of the subdivision. See Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 39 (1949)
(reasonable to require street width to accommodate general public traffic expected to trav-
erse the subdivision). See also Johnston, supra note 32, at 888-96.
80. Comment, supra note 34, at 796, 800. See note 79 supra.
81. See Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 273 A.2d 880 (Conn. 1970).
In Aunt Hack the Supreme Court of Connecticut observed that "[iln these days of bur-
geoning populations, critical housing problems and the incentive which they create for the
activity of land developers, the need for . . .open space for the welfare of people looms
large." Id. at 883.
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quired payments for extradevelopment capital funding. 2
C. Recent Decisional Criteria Favoring the Police Power
Validity of Impact Fees: A Proposed Test
In turning away from the restrictive standards of Gulest and Pi-
oneer Trust, state courts developed divergent and conflicting po-
lice power criteria for assessing the constitutional validity of ex-
tradevelopment capital funding fees.83 Some courts nominally
retained the Pioneer Trust test but reached patently contrary re-
sults without any explanation of the discrepancy." Other courts
adopted a privilege theory, under which granting the privilege to
subdivide entitles local governments to require payments for ex-
tradevelopment capital spending in return.85 The imposition of
these payment requirements is viewed more as part of a transac-
tion than as an exercise of the police power.8 Still other courts
have deferred to legislative judgments and eschewed constitutional
analysis of such payment requirements.87 Both the disparity be-
tween test and result and the inconsistent scrutiny applied to these
ordinances have been frequently criticized by commentators.8
In contrast to these result oriented techniques, a more disci-
plined constitutional standard was suggested by the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls.8 9 A two
part "rational nexus" test of reasonableness for judging the valid-
ity of extradevelopment impact and in lieu fees can be discerned in
the decision. In response to a developer's attack upon the ordi-
nance as both unauthorized by state statute and as an unconstitu-
82. Comment, supra note 34, at 800. See also note 31 and accompanying text, supra.
83. Johnston, supra note 32, at 877-914; Comment, supra note 34, at 799-802. Compare
Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 273 A.2d 880 (Conn. 1970) (applying
Pioneer Trust test but reaching opposite conclusion on similar facts) with Billings Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964) (the question whether the sub-
division created the need for parks has been answered by state legislature).
84. See Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 273 A.2d 880 (Conn. 1970)
(adopting the Pioneer Trust test but reaching opposite conclusion on similar facts).
85. See Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964) (act
of developer purely voluntary, no requirement that he subdivide his land).
86. Most courts have rejected the privilege theory which ignores the concept of develop-
ment rights. See Johnston, supra note 32, at 878. Cf. Marcus, Mandatory Development
Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The Case of Manhattan's Tudor City Parks, 24
BUFFALO L. REV. 77 (1974) (discussing development rights as a transferrable "stick" in the
bundle of rights held by a landowner).
87. See Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966) (overruling Gulest).
88. See Johnston, supra note 32, at 913-21.
89. 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
IMPACT FEES
tional taking without just compensation, the Jordan court ad-
dressed the constitutionality of in lieu fees for educational and
recreational purposes. After concluding that the fee payments were
statutorily authorized,90 the court focused first on the Pioneer
Trust "specifically and uniquely attributable" test.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court expressed concern that it was vir-
tually impossible for a municipality to prove that money payment
or land dedication requirements were assessed to meet a need
solely generated by a particular subdivision. 1 Suggesting a substi-
tute test, the court held that money payment and dedication re-
quirements for educational and recreational purposes were a valid
exercise of the police power if there was a "reasonable connection"
between the need for additional facilities and the growth generated
by the subdivision.'2 This first "rational nexus"'93 was sufficiently
established if the local government could demonstrate that a series
of subdivisions had generated the need to provide educational and
recreational facilities for the benefit of this stream of new re-
sidents.'4 In the absence of contrary evidence, such proof showed
that the need for the facilities was sufficiently attributable to the
activity of the particular developer to permit the collection of fees
for financing required improvements."
The Jordan court also rejected the Gulest direct benefit require-
ment, declining to treat the fees as a special assessment. Therefore,
it imposed no requirement that the ordinance restrict the funds to
the purchase of school and park facilities that would directly bene-
fit the assessed subdivision. Instead, the court concluded that the
relationship between the expenditure of funds and the benefits ac-
cruing to the subdivision providing the funds was a fact issue per-
90. 137 N.W.2d at 449-50. The court found sufficient authority for the in lieu fees based
on a general delegation of subdivision regulation powers. The in lieu fees were not specifi-
cally provided for by statute. Id.
91. 137 N.W.2d at 447. The court stated that:
[iun most instances it would be impossible for the municipality to prove that the
land required to be dedicated [or in lieu fees assessed] for a park or a school site
was to meet a need solely attributable to the anticipated influx of people into the
community to occupy this particular subdivision.
Id.
92. Id. at 447-48.
93. The term "rational nexus" was coined by commentators to describe the "reasonable
connection" required by the Jordan court. See Comment, supra note 34, at 802-07.
94. 137 N.W.2d at 447-48.
95. Id. According to the court, possible contravening evidence would include that the
municipality had acquired, prior to the growth, sufficient land and capital facilities to ac-
commodate the growth, or that the normal growth of the community would have necessi-
tated the capital acquisitions irrespective of the growth. Id.
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tinent to the reasonableness of the payment requirement under the
police power."
The Jordan court did not expressly define the "reasonableness"
required in the expenditure of extradevelopment capital funds;
however, a second "rational nexus" was impliedly required be-
tween the expenditure of the funds and benefits accruing to the
subdivision. The court concluded that this second "rational nexus"
was met where the fees were to be used exclusively for site acquisi-
tion 97 and the amount spent by the village in constructing addi-
tional school facilities was greater than the the amounts collected
from the developments creating the need for additional facilities.'8
This second "rational nexus" requirement inferred from Jordan,
therefore, is met if a local government can demonstrate that its
actual or projected extradevelopment capital expenditures
earmarked for the substantial benefit 99 of a series of developments
are greater than the capital payments required of those develop-
ments.100 Such proof establishes a sufficient benefit to a particular
96. Id. at 450.
97. This requirement can be inferred from the facts of the case and was not explicitly
posited by the court. State courts often require that funds collected from impact and in lieu
fees be held and allocated separately from the local government's general revenue funds.
See, e.g., Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 321 (Fla. 1976)
(impact fee not valid without restriction on use of funds collected). Cf. Call v. City of West
Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979) (in lieu fees may be deposited in city's general fund,
but may not be used for other purposes and held in trust committed to carrying out purpose
of fee).
98. 137 N.W.2d at 449. This criterion was used by the Supreme Court of Florida in dis-
tinguishing a regulation from a tax in the case of impact fees. See Contractors & Builders
Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1976).
99. The fact that the general public might incidentally benefit from the planned capital
facilities does not affect the reasonableness of the fee requirement Also, as long as the pay-
ment requirements are reasonably related to the needs created by the subdivision, the bene-
fits accruing to the development need not be clearly divisible from those received by the
general public.
On the other hand, when the capital improvements financed by the fee requirements are
remote from the particular subdivision the "benefit" requirements would not be met. For
example, if no parks or playgrounds have been constructed or planned to meet the needs of
a particular subdivision, and none are contemplated, an impact fee for recreational facilities
would not substantially benefit the development. The second rational nexus requirement
would not be met. But cf. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 630, 636 n.6 (1971) (difficult to see why in lieu fee for recreational purposes might not
be used to purchase or develop land some distance from the subdivision residents); Ayres v.
City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, (1949) (required dedications for roads outside development
which will also benefit general public are not unreasonable).
100. For instance, using moderncost accounting techniques, it is relatively easy for a
local government to calculate its educational capital expansion costs on a per dwelling unit
basis. By charging an impact fee based on this figure and demonstrating that facilities have
been constructed or are planned to serve the educational needs in the vicinity of the devel-
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subdivision in the stream of residential growth such that the ex-
tradevelopment payment requirements may be deemed to be rea-
sonable under the police power.1"1 Although most commentators
have overlooked the requirement of a "sufficient benefit" nexus in
analyzing the Jordan decision,10 the concept of benefits received is
clearly distinct from the concept of needs attributable. As the Jor-
dan court recognized, the benefit accruing to the subdivision, al-
though it need not be direct, is a necessary factor in analyzing the
reasonableness of payment requirements for extradevelopment
capital funding.10 8
The dual "rational nexus" requirements deducible from Jordan
provide a balanced, juridically consistent and realistic test of
money payment requirements for extradevelopment capital fund-
ing. This test properly focuses on and balances the legitimate in-
terests of the developer and the general welfare concerns and
power of the municipality. In addition, the "sufficiently attributa-
ble" and "sufficient benefit" proof requirements can be accurately
and realistically met by local governments through the use of mod-
ern cost accounting techniques. 104 Finally, once these "rational
nexi" are established, the burden to disprove the reasonableness of
the payment requirement shifts to the developer, according the lo-
cal government a semblance of the presumption of validity it en-
joys in zoning and other land use regulation matters.0 5 This dual
nexi test therefore provides the proper analytical framework for
constitutional evaluation of such payments under the police
power.106
opment, the local government would meet the "sufficient benefit" nexus requirement. See
the formula developed by Collier County, note 22 supra.
101. But see Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78 (1966) (no discussion of
benefits accruing to the subdivision).
102. See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 6; Johnston, supra note 32; Note, Impact Fees:
National Perspective to Florida Practice, 4 NOVA L.J. 137 (1980); Comment, supra note 34.
103. 137 N.W.2d at 450.
104. See generally Burchell, Edelstein & Listokin, Fiscal Impact Analysis as a Tool for
Land Use Regulation, 7 REAL EsT. L.J. 132, 132-33 (1978); Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 6,
at 1141-46; note 22 supra.
105. See note 83 and accompanying text, supra.
106. Compare the United States Supreme Court's distinction between a valid zoning or-
dinance and a taking in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980): "The application of
a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not sub-
stantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically viable use of
his land." Id. at 2141 (citations omitted).
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III. IMPACT FEES IN FLORIDA
A. Florida's Pre-platted Land Problem: An Additional Need
for Impact Fees
The rapid population growth which Florida has experienced in
recent years has made it a prime jurisdiction for the use of impact
fees to generate capital funds for growth burdened local govern-
ments. Florida, however, has a somewhat unique situation which
compounds the appropriateness of such fees-the pre-platted
lands problem.
In many states, land has been platted only after the demand for
immediate or near-term development has encompassed it. Conse-
quently, most lots are built upon soon after platting occurs. This
has not been the case in Florida. One of the most important and
infrequently discussed aspects of nearly a century of land "booms"
and "busts" in Florida is that hundreds of thousands of lots have
been platted but never developed.107 Most of the platting which
occurred before the 1970s did not involve exactions of any sort,
with the possible exception of road and drainage easements, and
when these "pre-platted" lots are built upon, no contribution to-
ward public services will have been made on their behalf. In the
case of land which was not pre-platted (perhaps even contiguous
land), owners must make contributions in the form of required
dedications or in lieu of payments toward public services as a con-
dition for platting and development.
Thus, whether land being presently developed has contributed
toward the capital costs of new public services will depend on
when the land was platted. The most recently platted land is dis-
criminated against because economically significant exactions in
Florida are a recent phenomenon. It would seem that the
best-and perhaps only-way to equalize this discrimination is via
impact fees. Through the collection of impact fees at the building
permit issuance stage of development, the required contribution to
public services, recognized by the courts as proper in connection
with platting, is imposed against land which has not made such a
contribution at the time of platting.108
B. Statutory Authorization for Impact Fees in Florida
Florida does not have a specific statute authorizing the imposi-
107. See Juergensmeyer, supra note 26, at 7.
108. Id.
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tion of impact fees for educational, recreational, and other capital
funding purposes. 109 Rather, several broad grants of authority to
counties and municipalities have been suggested as possible bases
for the imposition of extradevelopment impact fees under the po-
lice power.
One such base of authority is the home rule power of Florida's
counties and municipalities. 1 0 The home rule powers of municipal-
ities and counties are derived from different sources. Municipali-
ties receive home rule powers from the Florida Constitution1 1 and
the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act.11 Under these provisions,
municipalities are granted the "governmental, corporate and pro-
prietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government,
perform municipal functions and render municipal services," ' 3 in-
cluding the authority to adopt land use planning measures. This
home rule power is limited in that municipalities may not enact
legislation which is expressly prohibited by the state constitution
or which concerns any subject expressly preempted by state consti-
tution or general law.
In granting home rule powers to counties, the constitution differ-
entiates between charter and non-charter counties. " ' Article VIII,
section 1(g) grants to charter counties all the powers of local gov-
109. There have been four measures introduced in the state legislature in recent years
but no specific enabling act has passed. Fla. HB 3126 (Reg. Sess. 1974, introduced by Rep.
Boyd); Fla. HB 743 (Reg. Seass. 1975, introduced by Rep. Hawkins); Fla. HB 837 (Reg. Sess.
1975, introduced by Rep. Boyd); Fla. SB 1263 (Reg. Sess. 1975, introduced by Sen. Mac-
Kay). Builder lobbies have been instrumental in defeating these bills. See note 8 supra.
110. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1(f)-(g), 2(b); FLA. STAT. §§ 125.01, 166.021 (1979).
111. FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 2(b). Section 2(b) provides that municipalities shall have
broad home rule powers. The Florida Supreme Court in City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood
Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972), however, narrowly construed the provision, invalidat-
ing a rent control ordinance on the ground that the constitutional provision did not alter the
rule that the paramount law of the municipality is its charter which gives it all the power it
possesses. In 1973, apparently in response to the Fleetwood decision, the legislature enacted
the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, FLA. STAT. § 166.021 (1979), which made clear that
municipalities possessed broad home rule powers. The constitutionality of the act was ap-
proved in City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1975).
112. FLA. STAT. § 166.021 (1979). See note 110 supra.
113. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b); FLA. STAT. § 166.021(1) (1979). The Municipal Home
Rule Powers Act further provides that "[t]he Legislature recognizes that pursuant to the
grant of power set forth in s. 2(b), Art. VIII of the State Constitution, the legislative body of
each municipality has the power to enact legislation concerning any subject matter upon
which the state Legislature may act." FLA. STAT. § 166.021(3) (1979).
114. The Florida constitution provides for two types of county government. All counties
are empowered to adopt a county charter which allows them to establish a framework of
county government different from that otherwise prescribed by the constitution. See FLA.
CONST. art. VIII, §§ l(c), (f)-(g). Most Florida counties have not elected to adopt a county
charter.
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eminent not inconsistent with general law.11 This delegation of
powers is equivalent to the broad home rule powers granted mu-
nicipalities and would therefore presumably embrace the authority
to impose land use regulations. 1 Non-charter counties were not
granted the broad constitutional home rule powers enjoyed by mu-
nicipalities and charter counties.11 7 The legislature, however, pro-
vided a broad grant of statutory home rule powers to all counties
in enacting section 125.01 of the Florida Statutes.1 8 Although one
district court of appeal has ruled that this statutory home rule
power does not authorize the enactment of land use regulations,11 9
a recent supreme court opinion appears to have overruled that de-
cision.120 Therefore, non-charter counties should be able to enact
land use regulations based on this statutory delegation of home
rule powers as long as they are not inconsistent with state law.
There is no case law concerning whether these home rule provi-
sions provide adequate delegation of authority for the imposition
of an impact fee for extradevelopment capital expenditures. These
115. The provision states that "[c]ounties operating under county charters shall have all
powers of local self-government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law ap-
proved by vote of the electors." FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g).
116. Jason v. Dade County, 37 Fla. Supp. 190 (Dade County Cir. Ct. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 278 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The Jason case raised the issue
of statutory authority for a building moratorium. The court stated that the ordinance, as
well as other zoning ordinances and regulations, was authorized by home rule powers. 37
Fla. Supp. at 192.
117. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f). This section provides that "[clounties not operating
under county charters shall have such power of self-government as is provided by general or
special law." Id.
118. This statutory grant of power provides that:
The legislative and governing body of a county shall have the power to carry on
county government. To the extent not inconsistent with general or special law,
this power shall include, but shall not be restricted to, the power to:
(f) Provide parks, preserves, playgrounds, recreation areas, libraries, museums
... and other recreation and cultural facilities ....
(g) Prepare and enforce comprehensive plans for the development of the county.
(w) Perform any other acts not inconsistent with law which are in the common
interest of the people of the county, and exercise all powers and privileges not
specifically prohibited by law.
FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1979).
119. Townley v. Marion County, 343 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert.
denied, 354 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1978). The decision has been soundly criticized in J. JUERGEN-
SMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 14, § 3.03.
120. Speer v. Olson, 367 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1978). Although it concerned taxing power and
not land use control power, the Florida Supreme Court took a very liberal view of the gov-
ernmental powers possessed by such counties. Id. at 211, 213. See J. JUERGENSMEYER & J.
WADLEY, supra note 14, § 3.03 (concluding that Speer overrules Townley).
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provisions, however, have been recognized as broad grants of au-
thority which must be liberally construed. 12 1 Furthermore, a Flor-
ida Attorney General's opinion has concluded that home rule pow-
ers are sufficient authority for the imposition of required
dedications for educational purposes. 1"2 The Florida Supreme
Court, in a case involving sewer and water impact fees, at least
partially based their authorization on municipal home rule pow-
ers. s3 The home rule powers of Florida's local governments are
therefore likely to provide satisfactory authorization for the impo-
sition of impact fees for extradevelopment capital facilities.
12 4
Two additional possibilities for authority to impose impact fees
for extradevelopment capital funding, available equally to munici-
palities and counties, are the optional County and Municipal Plan-
ning for Future Development Act (CMPFDA)" 5  and the
mandatory Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of
1975 (LGCPA).1 2 '6 Both acts provide broad but non-specific grants
of subdivision regulation power to local governments and appear to
authorize impact fees for extradevelopment capital funding.1 27 The
121. City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1975). The supreme
court stated that § 166.021(1) "is a broad grant of power to municipalities in recognition and
implementation of Art. VIII, §2(b), Fla.Const. It should be so construed as to effectuate that
purpose where possible." Id. at 766 (footnotes omitted).
122. Op. AT'V GEN. FLA. 076-199 (1976). The opinion concludes that:
the City of North Miami Beach is authorized by s. 166.021, F.S., of the Municipal
Home Rule Powers Act, to adopt an otherwise valid ordinance requiring land de-
velopers to dedicate to the public for park purposes a portion of the land they are
developing within that city as a condition precedent to obtaining subdivision plat
approval ....
Id.
123. Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 319-20 (Fla. 1976),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979). The court distinguished several foreign state decisions
because municipalities in those states did not possess home rule powers. Id. at 320 n.9.
124. This assumes that a particular impact fee is construed as a regulation and not a tax.
If characterized as a tax, home rule powers might not be sufficiently specific to authorize it.
See notes 134-35 and accompanying text, infra.
125. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.160-.315 (1979). The CMPFDA was designed to authorize and
encourage counties and municipalities to develop and adopt comprehensive plans to guide
future development. Its purpose is now somewhat obsolete because the LGCPA requires
planning of all units of local government. See note 127 infra.
126. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3211 (1979). The LGCPA mandates comprehensive plan-
ning for all local governments. Once a comprehensive plan has been adopted all develop-
ment actions must be consistent with the plan. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(1) (1979).
127. The acts clearly evince a legislative policy that mandates and authorizes extensive
planning and management of growth by local governments. The LGCPA, in FLA. STAT. §
163.3194(2)(b) (1979), defines land development regulation as "any local government zoning,
subdivision, building and construction, or other regulations controlling the development of
land."
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LGCPA empowers local governments to impose regulations in ac-
cordance with their comprehensive plans to, among other things,
"facilitate the adequate and efficient provision of ... schools,
parks, [and] recreational facilities." 12 8 Significantly both acts ex-
pressly provide for liberal construction by the courts.12 9
Florida courts have yet to decide whether these broad delega-
tions of subdivision control powers authorize the imposition of im-
pact fees for extradevelopment capital funding.18 0 Other state
courts have held that similar broad and non-specific delegations of
subdivision control power authorize in lieu fees for education."''
Commentators have also suggested that these planning and subdi-
vision control acts provide adequate delegation of power for impact
fees for educational and recreational purposes.132 Provided the par-
ticular impact fee is construed by the courts as a land use regula-
tion and not a tax, the home rule powers of local governments and
subdivision control powers granted them by the CMPFDA and
LGCPA offer independent, sufficient statutory authorization for
the imposition of impact fees for extradevelopment capital
funding.
C. The Tax Versus Regulation Problem in Florida
If an impact fee for extradevelopment capital expenditures is
construed as a tax, the broad regulatory authority conferred by
home rule provisions and subdivision control statutes will be insuf-
ficient to sustain its validity. 83 In Florida, a tax must be specifi-
128. FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(3) (1979).
129. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.310, .3194(3)(b) (1979).
130. The Florida Supreme Court has on at least one occasion appeared willing to broadly
construe other statutes as authorizing the imposition of impact fees. Contractors & Builders
Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979). There
was no explicit statutory authority for impact fees to fund sewer and water facilities. Never-
theless, the court held that FLA. STAT. § 180.13(2) (1973), which permitted charging just and
equitable fees for water and sewer services, provided sufficient statutory authorization for a
"use fee" which shifted the cost of additional facilities to the new user. Id. at 319-20.
131. See Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965). The Jor-
dan court inferred the power to apply in lieu fees from a broad subdivision regulation en-
abling act. Id. at 449-50. The Wisconsin legislation was very similar to the subdivision regu-
lation provisions of the CMPFDA. See also Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 219
(Utah 1979) (finding authority for flood control and recreation in lieu fee based in broad
comprehensive planning enabling statute).
132. See J. JUnaGENSMEYgvn & J. WADLEY, supra note 14, § 17.03; Note, supra note 103,
at 162-74. But see Note, Municipalities: Validity of Subdivision Fees for Schools and
Parks, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 974 (1966).
133. Janis Dev. Corp. v. City of Sunrise, 40 Fla. Supp. 41, 59 (Broward County Cir. Ct.
1973), affd sub nom. Broward County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
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cally authorized by statute and will not be inferred from broad
delegations of authority. 184 Several Florida district courts address-
ing the validity of impact fees for extradevelopment capital fund-
ing have held that such fees were taxes and therefore unauthorized
and invalid.13 5
In Broward County v. Janis Development Corp.,'3 e the Fourth
District Court of Appeal reviewed an impact fee of $200 per dwell-
ing unit to fund road and bridge construction. An increased fee
was imposed on higher density developments because they im-
posed a greater traffic burden on the community. The Janis court
found that the impact fee was a tax because the ordinance failed to
specify where and when the monies collected were to be used.
3 7
The court so held even though the particular ordinance specified
that the funds were to be expended solely for roads and bridges in
or near the municipality from which they were collected."" In es-
sence, the court held that the fee was a tax rather than a regula-
tion because it failed the "direct benefit" test of Gulest.'8 '
App. 1975).
134. See, e.g., Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 319 (Fla.
1976), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 869 (1979) (municipality cannot impose a tax, other than an ad
valorem tax, unless authorized by state statute); City of Tampa v. Birdsong Motors, Inc.,
261 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1972) (taxation by a city must be expressly authorized by either the
constitution or the legislature; statutes authorizing taxation are to be strictly construed);
Janis Dev. Corp. v. City of Sunrise, 40 Fla. Supp. 41, 59 (Broward County Cir. Ct. 1973) (the
power to tax should be strictly construed and specifically authorized).
135. See Janis Dev. Corp. v. City of Sunrise, 40 Fla. Supp. 41 (Broward County Cir. Ct.
1973), aff'd sub nom. Broward County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1975) (impact fee for road and bridge construction an invalid tax); Venditti-Siravo,
Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 39 Fla. Supp. 121 (17th Cir. Ct. 1973) (impact fee for recreation
an invalid tax).
136. 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
137. Id. at 375. The court also relied on some rather archaic distinctions between a tax
and a regulation, stating that "[t]he only purpose for which a city might impose a fee is for
offsetting the necessary expense of regulation". Id. This contention was clearly rejected by
the Florida Supreme Court in Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d
314, 318 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 869 (1979).
138. 311 So. 2d at 374-75. The county ordinance provided that the fees and charges
collected pursuant to the ordinance shall be used "solely for the purpose of constructing or
improving roads, streets, highways and bridges . .. serving the vicinity of the project in
which the charges are collected." Broward County, Fla., Ordinance No. 73-2 (May 7, 1973).
139. As noted previously, the Gulest decision was overruled in New York, and along with
the Pioneer Trust test has been increasingly rejected by state courts. The court in Janis
cited the Jenad decision (which overruled Gulest). 311 So. 2d at 375. The court distin-
guished Jenad partly on the basis that Florida had yet to adopt a more liberal view towards
required dedication and in lieu fees. Recent Florida cases which seem to adopt a more flex-
ible approach to capital cost shifting devices would seem to thoroughly discredit the Janis
decision. See Wald Corp. v. Metro Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863, 868-69 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1976).
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Despite these restrictive decisions, the Florida Supreme Court in
Contractors & Builders Association v. City of Dunedin14 0 held that
a properly restricted impact fee which shifts the burden of ex-
tradevelopment capital expenditures to new residents need not be
considered a tax. The Builders Association attacked the validity of
an impact fee for sewer and water capital funding, claiming that
the money collected for capital improvements to the system was an
invalid tax. Expressly distinguishing Janis, the court stated that
"[iun contrast, evidence was adduced here that the connection fees
were less than costs Dunedin was destined to incur in accommo-
dating new users of its water and sewer systems."' 4 1 Because the
appropriate nexus had been established between the fee charged
and the capital costs of expansion necessitated by the new users,'4
the impact fee was held not to be a tax." The Dunedin decision
indicates that an impact fee which meets the dual rational nexi
criteria should not summarily be labeled a tax. Although a distinc-
tion could be made between sewer and water facilities and educa-
tional and recreational facilities, all are necessary services normally
provided by local governments.'"
The appropriate framework for determining whether an impact
fee is a regulation or a tax is one of public policy in which a num-
ber of factors should be weighed. " " The home rule powers granted
local governments in Florida,' 46 the legislative mandate that local
governments must plan comprehensively for future growth,14 7 and
the additional broad powers given them to make those plans work
effectively, 4 8 indicate that properly limited impact fees for educa-
tional or recreational purposes should be construed as regulations.
140. 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976).
141. Id. at 318.
142. See text accompanying notes 93-96 supra. See also Jordan v. Village of Menomonee
Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 450 (Wis. 1965) (court unable to decide whether in lieu fee a regula-
tion or an excise tax).
143. 329 So. 2d at 318. Policy considerations were also evident in the court determina-
tion that the fee was not a tax. See note 60 supra.
144. Education and recreation as well as sewer and water planning are all required ele-
ments of the comprehensive plan mandated by the LGCPA. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)
(a), (c) (1979). Also fiscal planning and proposals are required in the plan with respect to all
these types of capital facilities. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(3) (1979).
145. See text accompanying notes 60-68 supra.
146. See note 62 and accompanying text, supra; notes 108-25 and accompanying text,
supra.
147. See note 66 and accompanying text, supra; notes 126-33 and accompanying text,
supra.
148. See note 61 and accompanying text, supra; notes 127-29 and accompanying text,
supra.
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Characterization as a regulation is particularly appropriate where
an impact fee is used to complement other land use measures such
as in lieu fees or dedications." If an impact fee is characterized as
a regulation, its validity should then be determined by reference to
the dual rational nexi police power standard. 50
D. Emerging Criteria for Assessing the Police Power Validity
of Impact Fees in Florida
Early Florida decisions adopted a restrictive approach in assess-
ing the police power validity of land use regulations designed to
shift the burden of capital expenditures for extradevelopment fa-
cilities and improvements to new residents. Both the Gulest "di-
rect benefit" and the Pioneer Trust "specifically and uniquely at-
tributable" tests were used by courts to invalidate ordinances
requiring mandatory dedications or fees for educational and recre-
ational capital funding purposes.151 This restrictive approach, how-
ever, seems to have been abandoned 5 2 in accordance with the na-
tional trend.
53
This trend toward a less restrictive analysis is apparent in sev-
eral recent decisions. One Florida court has expressly adopted the
Jordan "rational nexus" test for assessing the validity of required
dedications under the police power.'" Although the validity of im-
149. See note 65 and accompanying text, supra.
150. The particularly intense pressure that growth has placed on local governments in
Florida should also be a factor which favors construing impact fees as regulations. See Boyd,
Florida Needs a Statewide Impact Fee, 2 FLA. ENVT'L & URBAN IssuEs 3 (no. 1 1974); note
68 and accompanying text, supra.
151. See Admiral Dev. Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1972) (dictum) (applied Pioneer Trust test to in lieu fees for recreational funding); Carlann
Shores, Inc. v. City of Gulf Breeze, 26 Fla. Supp. 94 (Santa Rosa County Cir. Ct. 1966)
(applied Pioneer Trust and Gulest tests to in lieu fee for park purposes). Other courts used
the tax label to invalidate similar fees.
152. The Pioneer Trust "specifically and uniquely attributable" test was rejected by the
Third District Court of Appeal in Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976), as unduly restrictive of local exercises of the police power. The
court cited the earlier Florida cases but refused to follow them. Id. at 866-67.
153. See note 32 and accompanying text, supra.
154. Wald, supra, note 153. The Wald court upheld the constitutionality of a Dade
County ordinance requiring the mandatory dedication of land for canals as a prerequisite to
plat approval. The case is of particular importance because, in determining the proper stan-
dard to apply, it examined and evaluated the highly deferential "reasonable relation" test,
the Jordan "rational nexus" approach, and the restrictive Pioneer Trust "specifically and
uniquely attributable" standard. Id. at 865-868. Out of concern for private property rights
the court rejected the "reasonable relation" test because it provided an unsatisfactory check
on the power of local governments to require dedication. Id. at 866. It also found the Pio-
neer Trust test unduly restrictive because it invalidates subdivision controls necessary for
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pact fees for education and recreation has not been directly ad-
dressed by Florida courts, the supreme court in Dunedin55 devel-
oped guidelines of reasonableness for sewer and water impact fees,
thus, implicitly adopting the "rational nexus" test of validity. 16
The Dunedin court held that it was permissible to shift the cost
of new facilities to users who generated the need for those im-
provements, 57 thus approving the impact fee concept. Although
the court made clear that requirements of reasonableness'" dic-
tated that the fees be limited to expansion costs necessitated by
the new users, it did not insist on the "specifically and uniquely
attributable" burden of proof required in Pioneer Trust. Instead,
the court recognized that the "costs of expansion" and the timing
of certain types of capital expenditures would be difficult to iden-
tify precisely, and stated that "perfection is not the standard" of a
city's duty in establishing a nexus between the fees charged and
the capital improvements required by the new users.15e Conse-
quently, the supreme court's standard in Dunedin would seem to
be equivalent to the "sufficiently attributable" rational nexus pro-
posed in Jordan.
Because of the tangible relationship between the new users con-
necting with the system and the new facilities required to provide
service to them, the limitation of the fees to those facilities like-
wise established a nexus between the fees charged and the benefits
received from the fees.110 In the case of impact fees for intangibly
the implementation of comprehensive planning. Id. at 866-67. The court held that the Jor-
dan "rational nexus" approach was the proper standard to apply because "[ilt allows the
local authorities to implement future-oriented comprehensive planning without according
undue deference to legislative judgments." Id. at 868.
155. 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976).
156. But see Rhodes, supra note 8, at 8. Rhodes argued that the lower court in Dunedin
adopted the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test. This analysis seems faulty because
the Pioneer Trust test would invalidate a fee for capital facilities that were required by the
overall growth of the community.
157. 329 So. 2d at 320. The court stated that "[rlaising expansion capital by setting
connection charges, which do not exceed a pro rata share of reasonably anticipated costs of
expansion, is permissible where expansion is reasonably required, if use of the money col-
lected is limited to meeting the costs of expansion" (emphasis in original) (footnote omit-
ted). Id. The court invalidated the ordinance because the funds collected were not restricted
to a separate fund from general revenues, but it allowed the city to amend its ordinance to
properly restrict funds which had already been collected. Id. at 321-22.
158. The court used the term "just and equitable" as well as "reasonable" because that
phrase was used in the enabling statute. See 329 So. 2d at 317.
159. Id. at 320 n.10.
160. The court was obviously concerned that a benefit nexus should be unequivocably
established because it required that the fees collected be deposited in a separate fund
limited to use in constructing additional facilities. Id. at 321-22.
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connected extradevelopment facilities such as schools and parks,
the flexible approach exhibited by the Dunedin decision indicates
the court would require only a "sufficient benefit" nexus between
the fee and capital improvements which benefit new residents
charged, rather than impose the "direct benefit" requirement of
Gulest.'61 Thus, despite early Florida decisions adopting the re-
strictive Gulest and Pioneer Trust tests, recent decisions indicate
that the dual rational nexus criteria is the proper standard to ap-
ply in assessing the police power validity of an impact fee for fund-
ing of educational, recreational, and other facilities.
E. Florida Impact Fees in the Post-Dunedin Era
Since the Supreme Court of Florida handed down its decision in
Dunedin, the pressures which created the interest of local govern-
ments in enacting such fees has greatly increased and more local
governments have pursued and embraced the concept. The most
recent activity of local governments is their extension of the im-
pact fee from the specifically sanctioned Dunedin sewer and water
hook-up charges to other key growth affected local governmental
services such as school, road, and park construction.
In 1977, Broward County enacted an ordinance requiring devel-
opers to dedicate land, or pay an in lieu fee, or pay an impact fee
for park construction purposes. If the developer chooses to pay the
impact fee, it is collected at the building permit issuance stage of
development.""
In 1979, Broward County enacted a similar ordinance designed
to raise capital funds for school sites. Again, there can be a dedica-
161. See Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979). The Utah Supreme
Court remarked that:
the plaintiffs attack the ordinance on the ground that the land dedicated (or the
money in lieu thereof) is not to be used solely and exclusively for the benefit of
the created subdivision. They point to the provision that the land is received'for
the benefit and use of the citizens of the City of West Jordan' and the money is
used for 'its [West Jordan's] flood control and/or parks and recreation facilities.'
We agree that the dedication should have some reasonable relationship to the
needs created by the subdivision .... But it is so plain as to hardly require ex-
pression that if the purpose of the ordinance is properly carried out, it will re-
dound to the benefit of the subdivision as well as to the general welfare of the
whole community. The fact that it does so, rather than solely benefiting the indi-
vidual subdivision, does not impair the validity of the ordinance.
Id. at 220 (footnote omitted).
162. BROwARD CouNTry, FLA., CODE § 5-192(e)(2) (1977). The constitutionality of this
provision was recently affirmed in a circuit court decision. Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward
County No. 80-2909 (17th Cir. Ct. March 20, 1981).
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tion of land, and an in lieu payment or the payment of an impact
fee calculated on a dwelling unit basis. This fee, however, is col-
lected as a precondition to plat approval. 163
In 1978, Collier County enacted an impact fee to obtain school
contruction funds. The fee is calculated on a dwelling unit basis
and its payment is made a precondition to building permit issu-
ance.1' In 1979, Palm Beach County enacted a road impact fee
which, following the traditional mold, is collected when the build-
ing permit is issued.16
Although litigation has been filed in regard to several of these
recently enacted impact fees, the only reported Florida case di-
rectly relevant to impact fees decided since the supreme court's
decision in Dunedin is a "relitigation" of the Dunedin case it-
self.1 66 Although the trial court on remand held that the "earmark-
ing" defects found by the supreme court had been cured, it never-
theless ordered a refund of the fees paid prior to the time the city
of Dunedin had satisfied the supreme court's earmarking require-
ments. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed. The refund
aspect of this decision would seem to add little of significance to
Florida's body of impact fee law. The decision, however, does seem
significant in that the court took the opportunity to enthusiasti-
cally endorse the impact fee concept.
CONCLUSION
Impact fees for intradevelopment and extradevelopment capital
funding will continue to emerge as an important tool enabling local
governments to cope with the environmental, service delivery, and
financial problems brought about by accelerating suburban growth.
Legislation specifically authorizing such impact fees is needed to
clarify their status. 6" Despite the absence of specific legislative au-
thorization and definition of impact fees, properly drawn impact
fees for capital funding may nevertheless be validly enacted in
Florida pursuant to the home rule and subdivision control powers
163. Broward County, Fla., Ordinance 79-1 (January 24, 1979).
164. Collier County, Fla., Ordinance 78-36 (July 18, 1978).
165. Palm Beach County, Fla., Ordinance 79-7 (July 9, 1979).
166. City of Dunedin v. Contractors & Builders Ass'n, 358 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978). The district court in Village of Royal Palm Beach v. Home Builders & Contrac-
tors Ass'n, 386 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980), referred approvingly to the Janis
decision in a one sentence per curiam opinion, but it is unclear what issue the court was
using Janis to resolve.
167. See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 6, at 1155-57.
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granted local governments."'
The recent increase of impact fees in Florida will certainly accel-
erate as the financial problems posed for local governments by ur-
ban growth become more acute. Courts may not receive all aspects
of impact fees with enthusiasm but general approval would seem
inescapable in view of the less desirable alternatives-exclusionary
growth restrictions or a significant decrease in the quality of life
available to residents of growing communities.
168. In concluding their analysis of the constitutionalvalidity of required dedications
and fees for extradevelopment capital funding, Heyman & Gilhool stated:
We have chosen to challenge the emerging rule that would prohibit exactions for
a full range of municipal capital expenditures, particularly for schools and recrea-
tion. It seems important to us to free so imprecise and troublesome an area as
municipal finance, haunted so often by necessity, from inflexible constitutional
strictures .... [M]unicipalities must meet the demands of the day as best they
can, finding a few hundred thousand dollars here and there wherever they can. So
long as our sense of fairness is not seriously affronted--and exactions of the sort
we have discussed here fall within that limit-municipalities must be left to find
their salvation.
Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 6, at 1157.
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